

18 MAY 1968

The Honorable William P. Dundy
Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dill:

25X1A

I have looked at the draft paper, "Reconnaissance of North Vietnam," which was tabled at the 7 May meeting of your committee and provided through [REDACTED]

Concurrent with your consideration of this problem, the U. S. Intelligence Board has taken up the matter of requirements for photographic reconnaissance of targets in North Vietnam in event of a truce. There is attached a statement of the requirements as approved by the U. S. Intelligence Board which I recommend you substitute for Annex D, "Target Coverage," to your draft paper.

Regarding Annexes A, B, and C and those sections of the draft paper which go into such questions as mission rates, platform capabilities, and type of coverage, I suggest that these be eliminated from the policy framework established by your committee and that these details be worked out through the existing procedures of the Intelligence Community set up for this purpose.

Sincerely,

(s) Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Attachment: [REDACTED]

TS 189064
Copy 6 of 10

TOP SECRET

ATTACHMENT

USIB Recommended Target Coverage

Assumptions: It is assumed that reconnaissance coverage will continue over Laos at present levels and that no restriction will be placed on aerial or surface reconnaissance conducted on or over international waters adjacent to North Vietnam.

Target Coverage: It is essential that airborne imagery reconnaissance be conducted over North Vietnam as follows:

- a. It is necessary to maintain coverage of selected indicator targets* and the DMZ, as often as weather and operational factors permit, during the initial period of a truce until we are confident of North Vietnam's probable military posture as well as during any subsequent period in which other sources indicate the possibility of significant change in that military posture.
- b. For the same reasons, it is necessary to maintain at least weekly coverage of selected highways, railways, and border areas of the Panhandle south of 20° north.
- c. It is also necessary to obtain weekly coverage of selected high priority railyards and ports (to include related air defense facilities) in the northern segment of North Vietnam which could give pre-operational evidence of the introduction of surface-to-surface missiles or other weapons into North Vietnam.
- d. For the remainder of North Vietnam, at least twice monthly coverage of military and logistical targets to support intelligence assessments of the nature and extent of any buildup in other areas of North Vietnam.

*If this list were to be drawn up at this time, it would contain about ten targets, probably including:

Two infiltration route segments

The Mu Gia pass

Haiphong

Four rail transloading areas identified in

Selected airfields

TS 189064

TOP SECRET

e. Coverage obtained in meeting the preceding requirements should be programmed to meet current area coverage requirements needed to search for the introduction of new weapons into North Vietnam.

f. In addition to photographic surveillance of the border areas outlined above, infrared and high resolution radar coverage is selectively required to detect evidence of infiltration during hours of darkness and inclement weather.

TS 189064

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED when blank — TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document — Automatically downgraded to SECRET when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE DDCI	CIA CONTROL NO. TS 189064
DOC. NO. TS 189064	DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE	LOGGED BY ER SF
COPY NO. # 6	
NUMBER OF PAGES 3	
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS	

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

[illegible]

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

DOWNGRADED		DESTROYED		DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)	
TO		BY (Signature)		TO	
BY (Signature)		WITNESSED BY (Signature)		BY (Signature)	
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

TOP SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

(40)

TOP SECRET